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ARTICLE 
TOLERANCE, SOCIETY, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: RECONSIDERATIONS 
R. MARY HAYDEN LEMMONS, PH.D.* 
Tolerance is so indispensable for a pluralistic society that the state has 
a compelling interest in promoting it. For this reason, it is commonly as-
sumed that the state must not privilege religious beliefs over secular ones: 
to do so, it is feared, would unleash religious intolerance. This assumption 
is well-grounded in English and European history: for instance, during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the right of rulers to choose their sub-
jects' religion was firmly established in England by King Henry VIII and in 
Europe by the Peace of Westphalia. Even pre-revolutionary American colo-
nies could be differentiated by the religious beliefs of their founders: for 
instance, the Puritans (Congregationalist Calvinists) settled New England; 
Puritan dissenters settled Rhode Island; members of the Church of England 
settled Virginia, the metropolitan counties of New York, the Carolinas, and 
Georgia; the Quakers settled Pennsylvania and Delaware; and Catholics set-
tled Maryland but lost control in 1689. 1 This history of religious establish-
ment prior to 1776 may lead one to assume that religious beliefs breed 
intolerance, that tolerance compels the state to adopt a strict separation of 
church and state, and that the First Amendment requires a strict neutrality 
between religious belief and unbelief, as held in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation of Ewing Township.2 But, as we shall see, these assumptions not only 
are historically unsound, but also misconstrue the nature of tolerance and its 
proper relationship with truth and coercion. If so, the state's compelling 
interest in promoting tolerance requires the Supreme Court to adapt its cur-
rent interpretation of the First Amendment to permit the state to support the 
religious belief in God in a noncoercive and evenhanded way. 
* Associate Professor of Philosophy and Catholic Studies, University of St. Thomas, St. 
Paul, Minnesota. I wish to thank the editors of the Law Journal, especially Andrea Specht, for 
comments that dramatically improved this paper. 
1. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1422-27 (1990); see also Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Relig-
ious Liberty in America: A History (MacMillan Co. 1902); Benjamin Hart, Faith & Freedom: The 
Christian Roots of American Liberty (Here's Life Publishers 1988). 
2. 330 U.S. I, 18 (1947). 
75 
76 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 3:1 
The notion that the separation of church and state is required in order 
to prevent religious intolerance stems not only from history, but also from 
the notion that religious intolerance is necessitated by the certitude so char-
acteristic of religious beliefs. The assumption here is that only uncertainty 
grounds tolerance. The difficulty with this argument is that it not only iden-
tifies tolerance with intellectual virtue but restricts it to cases where one's 
opponent could be right.3 However, if this were so, tolerance would not be 
virtuous in cases of certitude. But tolerance is most needed when oppo-
nents are certain the other is wrong. Thus, it is absurd to ground tolerance in 
incertitude. We must therefore look elsewhere for the proper ground of tol-
erance. There are four additional possibilities: the argument from coercion's 
impotence; the argument from human dignity considered apart from the 
common good; the argument from the common good; and the divine sover-
eignty argument. 
The gist of the practical argument from the impotence of intolerance 
begins by identifying intolerance as attempting to produce beliefs through 
some kind of coercion. It proceeds by arguing that since coercion relies on 
pain, either physical or psychic, while persuasion requires insight into a 
new perspective, it is not possible for beliefs to be coerced. Accordingly, 
while a person might claim to have a belief in order to avoid ostracism, jail, 
a fine, torture, or death, the corresponding inner belief cannot be so gener-
ated. As put in 1685 by John Locke, "[IJf Truth makes not her way into the 
understanding by her own light, she will be but the weaker for any bor-
rowed force violence can add to her."4 
This argument from epistemology correctly argues that the ways of 
truth are not the ways of coercion: truth requires free inquiry. Freedom is 
especially presupposed by beliefs, including religious beliefs; after all, as 
pointed out by Thomas Aquinas, "[T]o believe depends on the [free 
choice]."5 However, although coercion adds nothing to truth's persuasive-
ness, it is not the case that beliefs are only generated by insights into truth. 
For, if this were so, there would be no false beliefs. Nor would cults be able 
to induce a false belief by the use of various physical techniques, e.g., isola-
tion and sleep deprivation. The use of such physical techniques is especially 
effective when victims lack the experiences that would contradict the false 
belief, when the falsehood is pervasive and persistently propagated, and 
when victims lack the ability to properly evaluate the belief. Without free 
inquiry, coercion may produce beliefs. If beliefs can thus be coerced, coer-
cion's impotence cannot be the proper ground of tolerance. 
3. For a detailed argument that tolerance cannot be an intellectual virtue, see Etienne Gil-
son, Dogmatism and Tolerance, 8 IntI. J. 7, 15 (1952-53) ("Against political fanaticism, a philo-
sophical relativism is the weakest conceivable protection."). 
4. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in On Politics and Education 21, 52 (How-
ard R. Penniman ed., Walter I. Black, Inc. 1947). 
5. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Pt. II-II, Question 10, art. 8. 
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If tolerance cannot be based on coercion's impotence or on the lack of 
certitude, than tolerance cannot be an intellectual virtue. Rather, it is a 
moral and political virtue, as pointed out by Etienne Gilson: 
Tolerance is a moral and a political virtue, not an intellectual one. 
As rational beings, our only duty towards ideas is to be right, that 
is to say, to seek truth for its own sake and to accept it as soon as 
we see it. As to error, whether it be found in ourselves or in the 
minds of other men, our only duty towards it is to denounce it as 
false. . . . The two notions of "tolerance" and of "intolerance" 
simply do not apply to the order of ideas. What we really mean by 
saying that we tolerate certain ideas is that we tolerate the exis-
tence of certain men who hold those ideas and that we respect 
their freedom of speech.6 
If tolerance is properly a moral and political virtue, then its proper ground 
seems to simply be human dignity and the obligations of justice. 
The argument basing tolerance on human dignity holds that since 
human dignity is based on human freedom and rationality, diverse human 
beliefs must be tolerated. The key problem with this argument, however, is 
that while it succeeds in forbidding any attempt to coerce beliefs, it cannot 
preclude the anarchy that could arise when individuals choose incompatible 
ends. Community life requires common ends. 
Could then community life be the proper basis for tolerance? Etienne 
Gilson thought so: 
[WJe tolerate [these men] ... because, even though we know that 
their ideas are wrong, these men are our fellow countrymen with 
whom we have to live in peace just as they themselves have to put 
up with us. Aristotle used to say that two moral virtues are the 
very pillars of political life: justice and friendship, which is what 
we today call the "good neighbor policy." Tolerance is nothing 
else than a particular application to the needs of political life, of 
the moral virtue of friendship? 
In other words, since no pluralistic community can exist without toleration, 
and since we tolerate only those with whom we are joined in some degree 
of friendship or community, neighborly love is the basis of toleration. In-
deed, communities united in a common love identify the pursuit of some 
common good as indispensable for each of its citizens. Hence, such com-
munities institute procedures of dissent and resolution,8 for it is only 
through such procedures that dissenters can participate in the community's 
common good. In the words of Karol Wojtyla, "[T]he structure [of a com-
munity] must not only allow the emergence of the opposition, give it the 
6. Gilson, supra n. 3, at 12. 
7. Id. at 12-13. 
8. This material on Wojtyla is largely taken from my Global Morality and Thomistic Natu-
ral Law: The Challenges sec. 3 (forthcoming). 
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opportunity to express itself, but also must make it possible for the opposi-
tion to function for the good of the community."9 Without such procedures, 
intolerance rules; and community members disengage from participating in 
the common good. The vices of "avoidance" or "conformism" thereby be-
come rooted. lO A voidance is the simple refusal to partake in the commu-
nity's life; conformism is the projection of caring about the common good 
while remaining indifferent to it. 11 These vices reacting to intolerance can 
only be avoided in communities that are structured to encourage "dialogues 
of opposition." Within such a community, tolerance would be seen as a 
social virtue that advances the common good by welcoming dissent and 
adjudicating it in ways that further involvement with the community's spe-
cific common goods. 12 Within the United States, legislative and judicial 
forums provide dissenters with avenues for making changes while retaining 
their participation in the community. Legislative and judicial forums thus 
inculcate respect for differences. By so doing, these forums promote toler-
ance and identify intolerance as unjust. 
Thus, it is possible to justify religious tolerance by arguing that since 
the common good requires maximizing the participation of citizens by re-
specting the human capacities for free choice and rationality, the common 
good is furthered by the state's guarantees of free speech and belief, which 
then establishes the right to religious freedom and toleration. This argument 
triumphed in the twentieth century by underwriting the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. Its preamble reads, 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foun-
dation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted 
in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of man-
kind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall en-
joy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want 
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common 
people, 
9. Karol Wojtyla (pope John Paul II), The Individual and the Common Good: Toward a 
Theory of Participation, in Toward a Philosophy of Praxis 24, 49 (Alfred Bloch & George T. 
Czuczka eds., Crossroad Publg. Co. 1981) (emphasis omitted). 
to. /d. at 50-51. 
11. Both avoidance and conformism originate within the conviction "that the community is 
taking away his self, and that is why he attempts to take his self away from the community." Id. at 
52 (emphasis omitted). 
12. Dissidents seek to redefine the common good so that one can "participate more fully and 
effectively in the community." Id. at 49. 
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The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peo-
ples and all nations. 13 
79 
The hard-won insights of this argument from human dignity and the com-
mon good mark it as one of the great treasures of human intellectual his-
tory. Its power and philosophical soundness are not to be underestimated. 
However, despite this argument's insightfulness and historical signifi-
cance, it fails to persuade two groups. The first group consists of strict secu-
larists who consider religious beliefs to be so harmful to the body politic as 
to warrant their elimination from society. These strict secularists argue that 
law should be hostile to religious belief and practices. They would never 
have condoned the Constitution's Free Exercise Clause. 
The second group, unpersuaded by the argument from the common 
good, are ideologues who identify the state as the means for insuring doctri-
nal conformity. For ideologues, religious freedom and toleration breed a 
vicious pluralism, since they identify free inquiry, the marketplace of ideas, 
and the toleration of diverse religious practices as the vices that permit in-
decency and immorality to run rampant in the state. By so doing, the ideo-
logue assumes that conformity with his own doctrinal beliefs is so essential 
to the community's wellbeing that anyone who fails to adhere to his doc-
trines attacks the body politic. The ideological conflation of doctrinal and 
political goods, however, cannot long endure when the fervent, holding di-
verse doctrines, must unite politically-at least, that was the case in colo-
nial America. For although colonial America was largely settled by 
religious ideologues, or theocrats, willing to risk a long and dangerous sea 
voyage to a hostile new world in order to establish political societies that 
reflected their own religious beliefs,14 by the time of the Constitutional 
Convention, the reality of America's religious pluralism precluded using 
either the strict secularist or the theocratic model of government and neces-
sitated toleration for the free exercise of religious faith. For there would not 
have been a new nation if the Calvinists of New England had not united 
with the dissident Puritans in Rhode Island; the Quakers in Pennsylvania 
and Delaware; the Anglicans of Virginia, South Carolina, North Carolina, 
and Georgia; as well as with the various religious believers who lacked a 
colony or state to call their own, e.g., the Catholics and the Jews. The need 
for these diverse religious believers to join together and establish a "more 
perfect union" led them to formulate the First Amendment, so that the free 
exercise of their religious beliefs would be protected not only from the es-
tablishment of a national church, but also from any other law. 
13. Universal Decl. of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, preamble. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess .• 
U.N. Doc N810 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 
14. Although there were notable exceptions (Pennsylvania, Delaware, the Carolinas, and 
Rhode Island) the American colonies were not founded as religiously tolerant societies. McCon-
nell, supra n. I, at 1425, 1430. 
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These religious believers established religious freedom, and thereby 
tolerance, not on the basis of human dignity,1S but on the basis that one's 
obligations to God could not be contravened by the state. 16 Accordingly, the 
new republic based religious freedom and tolerance on the grounds that the 
justice owed to the Creator was greater than the justice owed to any politi-
cal community or government. Indeed, this innovative American ground of 
tolerance was self-consciously adopted when language in earlier versions of 
the First Amendment was stricken because it would have obligated the tol-
eration of any basic worldview as being entailed by the right of con-
science. 17 By striking the right of conscience from these early versions, the 
founders were not attempting to exempt belief in general from the domain 
of the state, but only the belief in God. In other words, certitude that God 
exists and that religious obligations are beyond the scope of the states' 
oversight led America's founders to privilege the religious exercise of be-
lief and to mandate religious freedom and tolerance. Accordingly, religious 
toleration was considered by most delegates at the Constitutional Conven-
tion to be a social and political virtue rather than an intellectual one. Thus, 
it was the religious belief in God and his sovereignty that generated the 
religious tolerance mandated by the First Amendment's free exercise and 
establishment clauses. 
If the American founders are right that justice toward God is the 
proper source of religious toleration, then the state has a compelling interest 
in supporting the religious belief in God, albeit in ways that discriminate 
neither against the nonbeliever nor against minority religions. But, as the 
next section shows, the Supreme Court's predominant interpretation of the 
First Amendment permits no such support. If so, then the Court is failing, 
not only to accord with the insights of our founders, but also to properly 
nurture the tolerance so indispensable for our religiously pluralistic 
community. 
15. /d. at 1497 ("The freedom of religion is unalienable because it is a duty to God and not a 
privilege of the individual. . .. Much of the criticism of a special deference to sincere religious 
convictions arises from the assumption that such convictions are necessarily mere subcategories of 
personal moral judgments. This amounts to a denial of the possibility of a God (or at least of a 
God whose will is made manifest to humans). But ... [this skeptical position] ... is a peculiar 
belief to project upon the framers and ratifiers of the first amendment, for whom belief in the 
existence of God was natural and nearly universal. It is an anachronism, therefore, to view the free 
exercise clause as a product of modem secular individualism.") (citation omitted). 
16. [d. McConnell supports this claim with painstaking and careful research into various 
historical documents. This research also supports his claims that Madison rejected the Lockeanl 
Jeffersonian view of religious toleration as based on the irrelevance of religious faith for the 
secular world in favor of the pOSition that the demands of state had to be subordinated to those of 
God. [d. at 1449-55. 
17. [d. at 1491, 1493-97. McConnell also points out a less likely possibility for striking the 
phrase "liberty of conscience" from earlier versions of the First Amendment, namely, that it was 
stricken as redundant, since "conscience" was so widely taken as pertaining to religious belief. 
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INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND TOLERANCE 
For the last several decades, the Supreme Court has held that the Es-
tablishment Clause requires government to refrain from promoting religious 
belief in God. As put by Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Education of 
Ewing Township:18 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can 
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from 
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief 
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or 
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or 
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be lev-
ied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever 
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or 
practice religion .... In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of 
separation between Church and State."19 
This maximist interpretation contains at least five different principles: 1) 
the principle that forbids the establishment of a national church; 2) the prin-
ciple that forbids the coercion of religious belief, or disbelief; 3) the princi-
ple of neutrality or evenhandedness between religions; 4) the principle of 
neutrality or evenhandedness between belief and disbelief; and, 5) the prin-
ciple of secularism that forbids any religious aid. The last two secularist 
principles led to the Lemon test, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,z° This test holds 
that laws do not violate the Establishment Clause if they have a secular 
legislative purpose, if their primary effect neither advances nor inhibits re-
ligion, and if they are not excessively entangled with religion. Hence, es-
sential to the maxirnist interpretation is that the Establishment Clause 
forbids the support of religious belief and establishes a legal preference for 
secularism. 
The maximist or secularist interpretation need not, however, be consid-
ered proper. Justice Rehnquist argued, in his 1985 dissent in Wallace v. 
laffree,21 that it is historically incorrect to interpret the Establishment 
Clause as requiring neutrality between religion and irreligion. Indeed, the 
First Amendment's Establishment Clause "should be read no more broadly 
than to prevent the establishment of a national religion or the governmental 
preference of one religious sect [within Christianity] over another."22 Rehn-
18. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
19. Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878». 
20. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
21. 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
22. Id. at 100. 
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quist continued by noting that there is nothing in the Establishment Clause 
that prohibits a general" 'endorsement' of prayer.'m Nonetheless, despite 
the insightfulness of Rehnquist's analysis, Wallace proscribed silent medi-
tation in public schools in order to prevent silent prayer. The Court thus 
decided that voluntary and silent prayer in public schools was not to be 
tolerated. Likewise, the Court decided in Lee v. Weisman24 that school 
graduations could not tolerate invocations and benedictions. 
The Court's adherence to interpreting the Establishment Clause ac-
cording to the principles of secularism and neutrality between belief and 
unbelief led the Court to rule, in County of Allegheny v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,25 that a nativity creche-
clearly identified as sponsored by the Holy Name Society-could not be 
displayed in the Allegheny County courthouse, because that would entangle 
government in the endorsement of religion. Government must remain secu-
lar. To do otherwise would be an endorsement of religion that "sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they 
are insiders, favored members of the political community."26 
The Court however did not adequately consider whether the refusal of 
governmental agencies to permit religious displays sends a message that 
religious believers are outsiders, while atheists and agnostics are "insiders, 
favored members of the political community."27 Neither did the Court con-
sider whether the act of exclusion necessarily establishes insiders and out-
siders. Nor did the Court consider whether a policy of non-exclusiveness or 
accommodation would have better supported the nation's interest in pro-
moting tolerance, while avoiding the establishment of any particular church. 
Most significantly, the Court failed to consider whether the outlawing of a 
nativity creche on the basis of its religious message interferes with the Free 
Exercise Clause by burdening religious expression with the suspicion that it 
is so dangerous and harmful as to be forbidden within governmental spaces. 
By not considering the constitutionality of religious displays in the context 
of its Free Speech and Free Exercise rulings, the Court failed to consider 
whether the maximist reading of the Establishment Clause, as forbidding all 
but secular messages, establishes secularism as the nation's religion. After 
all, in Torcaso v. Watkins,28 the Supreme Court explicitly identified secular 
humanism as a religion.29 This identification in Torcaso set the Court's free 
23. Jd. at 114. 
24. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
25. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
26. Jd. at 595 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring». 
27. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595. 
28. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
29. Jd. at 495 n. II ("Among religions in this country which do not teach what would gener-
ally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular 
Humanism and others. [See Washington Ethical Socy. v. Dist. of Columbia. 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. 
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exercise jurisprudence at odds with her establishment jurisprudence, which 
considers unconstitutional those laws that fail to be secular, Thus, it was the 
myopia of the Court's maximist interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
that led her to forbid the Allegheny creche, 
Outlawing the Allegheny creche sent the message that religious beliefs 
in God are unworthy of public spaces. Or, as Justice Kennedy put it in his 
dissent, Allegheny "reflects an unjustified hostility toward religion."30 This 
hostility arises, according to Kennedy, from the "clear message of disap-
proval" sent by the wall of separation?1 Disapproval is embedded in the 
requirement that the government tolerate only the secular aspects of Christ-
mas and other holidays, which means that the government can respect holi-
days "only as celebrated by nonadherents."32 
In the last few decades, the Court's hostility, or religious intolerance, 
has waxed and waned. On the one hand, in Agostini v. Felton,33 the Lemon 
test was modified so that the neutrality of the primary effect subsumes the 
requirement of avoiding excessive entanglement. The revised criteria pro-
scribed government indoctrination and the identification of aid recipients by 
reference to religion. Although Agostini retained the principle of neutrality 
between the religious, irreligious, and areligious, it argued that reliance on 
private choices precludes an establishment of religion. And, in Lamb's 
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,34 Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,35 and Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School,36 the Supreme Court ruled that the Free Speech 
Clause required public schools to accommodate religious groups and relig-
ious speech when there was little danger that the public would think that the 
schools were endorsing religion or a particular creed. As Justice Thomas 
put it for the Court in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, "Instead, 
we reaffirm our holdings in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger that speech 
discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a lim-
ited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a relig-
ious viewpoint:>37 In other words, given that the topic is secular, discussion 
Cir. 1957); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 
1957); John Clark Archer, Faiths Men Live By 120-38, 254-313 (2d ed., Ronald Press 1958); 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences vol. 2, 293 (Dushkin Publg. Group 1975); Encyclopaedia 
Britannica vol. 4,325-27 (WaIter Yust ed., Encyclopaedia Britannica 1957); [d. at vol. 21, 797; 
Year Book of American Churches 29. 47 (Nat!. Council of Churches of Christ in Am. 1961); 
World Almanac and Book of Facts 695,712 (Press Publg. Co. 1961).]"). 
30. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White & Scalia, JJ., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
31. [d. at 657. 
32. Id. at 664. 
33. 522 U.S. 803 (1997). 
34. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
35. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
36. 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
37. Id. at 111-12 (emphasis omitted). 
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of the topic from the religious perspective is permissible-even within lim-
ited public forums. Hence, not only must the state not avoid the religious 
perspective, but the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause de-
mand that the state permit religious viewpoints. This is nothing less than a 
rejection of the principle of secularism and a modification of the Lemon 
test, which held that the primary effect of a ruling must be secular. Relig-
ious intolerance was thus dealt a significant, but hardly fatal, blow. 
On the other hand, in Employment Division v. Smith,38 the Court threw 
out the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine.39 In Smith, the Court ruled that generally 
applicable laws are constitutional even if they burden religious exercise. 
Smith, in effect, established a principle of indifference towards unintention-
ally burdening religious practice. Smith's jurisprudence was upheld in 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah40 and in City of 
Boerne v. Flores.41 Justice O'Connor's dissent in Boerne is especially 
compelling: 
I continue to believe that Smith adopted an improper standard for 
deciding free exercise claims. In Smith, five Members of this 
Court-without briefing or argument on the issue-interpreted 
the Free Exercise Clause to permit the government to prohibit, 
without justification, conduct mandated by an individual's relig-
ious beliefs, so long as the prohibition is generally applicable. 
Contrary to the Court's holding in that case, however, the Free 
Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination principle that 
protects only against those laws that single out religious practice 
for unfavorable treatment. Rather, the Clause is best understood 
as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious 
practices and conduct without impermissible governmental inter-
ference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, gener-
ally applicable law. Before Smith, our free exercise cases were 
generally in keeping with this idea: where a law substantially bur-
dened religiously motivated conduct-regardless whether it was 
specifically targeted at religion or applied generally-we required 
government to justify that law with a compelling state interest and 
to use means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 
The Court's rejection of this principle in Smith is supported 
neither by precedent nor, as discussed below, by history. The de-
cision has harmed religious liberty. For example, a Federal Dis-
trict Court, in reliance on Smith, ruled that the Free Exercise 
Clause was not implicated where Hmong natives objected on re-
38. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
39. The Sherbert-Yoder principle combined the reasoning in two cases; namely, Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). These cases estab-
lished the principle that the government cannot burden religious exercise without a compelling 
interest that cannot be served by a less restrictive means. 
40. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
41. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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ligious grounds to their son's autopsy, conducted pursuant to a 
generally applicable state law. The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held that application of a city's zoning laws to pre-
vent a church from conducting services in an area zoned for com-
mercial uses raised no free exercise concerns, even though the 
city permitted secular not-for-profit organizations in that area .... 
These cases demonstrate that lower courts applying Smith no 
longer find necessary a searching judicial inquiry into the possi-
bility of reasonably accommodating religious practice.42 
85 
Smith's principle of indifference to burdening religious practice unduly re-
stricts the free exercise of religion and even hinders the ability of citizens to 
petition government for redress of those burdens. 
In accordance with the hostility of Smith to religious exercise, the 
Court has continued to invoke the Establishment Clause in ways that hinder 
the free exercise of religious belief. For instance, the Court declared uncon-
stitutional student-initiated, student-led prayers at football games in Santa 
Fe Independent School District v. Doe.43 In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, characterized this decision as 
bristling "with hostility to all things religious in public life."44 
The Court thus comes to a fork in the road: it must either repudiate 
Smith's principle of indifference towards unintentionally burdening relig-
ious exercise and Everson's maximist interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause (which established the principle of neutrality between belief and un-
belief) or continue burdening the Free Exercise Clause by its hostility to-
wards religious practice. If the Court continues her current jurisprudence, 
logic dictates that she declare many sacred American traditions to be uncon-
stitutional, e.g., legislative prayers, the legislated national motto "In God we 
trust," the Pledge of Allegiance's phrase "One nation under God," as well 
as "the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the 
proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; 'so help me God' in 
our courtroom oaths ... [and] the supplication with which the Court opens 
each session: 'God save the United States and this Honorable Court.' "45 
Indeed, belief in God is an indispensable part of American legal and politi-
cal culture.46 Hence, to purge that belief from American traditions would be 
42. Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted). 
43. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
44. Id. at 318. 
45. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952). 
46. As put by Chief Justice Burger, while writing for the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 674-76 (1984) (citations omitted): 
There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of 
government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789. Seldom in our 
opinions was this more affirmatively expressed than in Justice Douglas' opinion for the 
Court validating a program allowing release of public school students from classes to 
attend off-campus religious exercises. Rejecting a claim that the program violated the 
Establishment Clause, the Court asserted pointedly: "We are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being ... " Our history is replete with official refer-
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to betray traditions ongoing since the nation's founding; it would be to in-
terfere with the right of religious believers to freely exercise their belief that 
some occasions require joining together in prayer and invoking God's in-
tercession; and, it would be intolerant. 
But if the Court were to repudiate Everson's principle of neutrality 
between belief and unbelief as well as Smith's principle of indifference to-
wards unintentionally burdening religious exercise, she would be able to 
authorize religious accommodations except in cases of compelling state in-
terest. She would be reaffirming the minimalist interpretation given to the 
Establishment Clause in Lynch v. Donnelly.47 In this case, the Court argued 
that the city of Pawtucket need not exclude its creche from its Christmas 
display, in part, because our history shows an accommodation of "all faiths 
and all forms of religious expressions [with] hostility toward none."48 
The position that the Establishment Clause need not entail belief neu-
trality has also been argued by Rehnquist in his 1985 Wallace v. laffree49 
dissent; by Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia in 
their 1989 Allegheny dissent; and by Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, in their 2000 Santa Fe dissent. In Wallace, Rehnquist used 
historical records to argue the following: 
None of the other Members of Congress who spoke during the 
August 15th debate expressed the slightest indication that they 
thought the language before them from the Select Committee, or 
the evil to be aimed at, would require that the Government be 
absolutely neutral as between religion and irreligion. The evil to 
be aimed at, so far as those who spoke were concerned, appears to 
have been the establishment of a national church, and perhaps the 
preference of one religious sect over another; but it was definitely 
not concerned about whether the Government might aid all reli-
gions evenhandedly. 50 
Furthermore, the dissent by Kennedy in Allegheny pointed out that the cur-
rent interpretation of the Establishment Clause is at odds with the ongoing 
tradition, instituted by George Washington, for the president to proclaim 
ences to the value and invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronounce-
ments of the Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders .... 
Executive Orders and other official announcements of Presidents and of the Con-
gress have proclaimed both Christmas and Thanksgiving National Holidays in religious 
terms .... 
Other examples of reference to our religious heritage are found in the statutorily 
prescribed national motto "In God We Trust," which Congress and the President man-
dated for our currency, and in the language "One nation under God," as part of the 
Pledge of Allegiance to the American flag. That pledge is recited by many thousands of 
public school children-and adults-every year. 
47. 465 U.S. 668. 
48. /d. at 677. 
49. 472 U.S. at 9l. 
50. /d. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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national days of prayer.51 Kennedy also argued that Allegheny's endorse-
ment test is incompatible with the precedents set by Lynch v. Donnelly, 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and Walz v. Tax Commission of 
the City of New York., 397 U.S. 664 (970).52 Finally, Kennedy argued that 
the Establishment Clause should be understood as forbidding government 
coercion, whether direct or indirect, in favor of religious participation or 
belief, and as forbidding the government to proselytize on the behalf of a 
particular religious faith.53 
Following Rehnquist's and Kennedy's lead, Justice Thomas, in his Elk 
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow54 concurring opinion, strength-
ened the historical criticism by noting that the First Amendment was passed 
at a time when at least six states had an established religion,55 and most had 
a free exercise of religion clause.56 Accordingly, the Establishment Clause 
was not passed to render government neutral between belief and unbelief, 
but rather to protect the colonial right of individual states to establish a state 
church from being usurped by the establishment of a national church. 
Hence, using the Establishment Clause to forbid government support of re-
ligious belief in God betrays history. 
Moreover, Thomas argued that the proper interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause is not in terms of neutrality but in terms of "actual legal 
coercion."57 This minimalist reading would enable the Establishment 
Clause, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to protect individuals from being 
required to believe in God, a right repeatedly upheld by the Court.58 
Thomas also points out that the forbidding of coercion would include bar-
ring "governmental preferences for particular religious faiths."59 
If the Court were to adopt the minimalist reading, then it would be able 
to preserve the first three principles of the Establishment Clause identified 
in Everson, namely, the proscription of a national church, the proscription 
of coercively facilitating religion, and the proscription of favoritism be-
51. 492 U.S. at 671. 
52. 492 U.S. at 669-70. 
53. !d. at 659. 
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to sup-
port or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding 
hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it, 
in fact, "establishes a [State] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so." 
[d. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678). 
54. 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004). 
55. [d. (citing McConnell, supra n. I, at 1437). 
56. McConnell, supra n. I, at 1455-58. 
57. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 52. 
58. See id. at 48-49 (Thomas cites these cases in favor of this claim that the government 
cannot require belief in God: Empl. Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
877 (1990); Allegheny, 492 U.s. at 594; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 126-27; Widmar v. Vin· 
cent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489.). 
59. Elk Grove. 542 U.S. at 53 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 856 (Thomas, J., 
concurring». 
88 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:1 
tween religious groups that believe in God. Preserving these three Everson 
principles would preserve the bulk of post-Everson rulings as good law, 
e.g., School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp and its proscrip-
tion against daily Bible readings in public schools insofar as those readings 
mandated a school preference of one particular belief in God over others;60 
Widmar v. Vincent and its principle that religious student groups at state 
universities have the same right to funds as do secular student groups;61 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah62 and Larson v. Valente63 
and their ruling that law cannot disadvantage a particular religion; Sherbert 
v. Verner and its ruling that government must accommodate religious prac-
tice unless there is a compelling state interest to the contrary.64 Additional 
caselaw that would be upheld includes Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches 
Union Free School;65 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of 
Virginia;66 Good News Club v. Milford Central School;67 Agostini v. Fel-
ton;68 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District;69 Witters v. Washington 
Department of Services for the Blind;70 and Mueller v. Allen.71 The mini-
malist reading would also uphold Everson v. Board of Education of School 
District of the City of Highland Park and its ruling that parochial school 
busing is constitutional.72 
Furthermore, adoption of the minimalist interpretation would better 
protect the free exercise rights of the religious believer in God. Indeed, the 
maximistlsecularist reading has forbidden some public expressions of relig-
ious beliefs. For instance, Wallace v. laffree forbade silent meditation in 
schools;73 Lee v. Weisman forbade invocations and benedictions at public 
school graduations;74 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe forbade 
student-initiated, student-led prayers at football games;75 and County of Al-
legheny v. ACLU forbade the Holy Name Society from displaying its creche 
in the courthouse?6 The minimalist interpretation would permit government 
to accommodate religious displays as well as prayers or daily inspirational 
readings in public schools as long as these expressions of religious belief in 
60. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
61. 454 U.S. 263. 
62. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
63. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
64. 374 U.S. 398. 
65. 508 U.S. 384. 
66. 515 U.S. 819. 
67. 533 U.S. 98. 
68. 522 U.S. 803. 
69. 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
70. 493 U.S. 850 (1989). 
71. 2005 WL 2877800 (Utah App. Nov. 3, 2005). 
72. 123 Fed. Appx. 221 (6th Cir. 2005). 
73. 472 U.S. 38. 
74. 505 U.S. 577. 
75. 530 U.S. 290. 
76. 492 U.S. 573. 
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God were rotated in such a way that no particular belief in God received 
preferential treatment, or as long as these expressions were somehow medi-
ated through private choice, e.g., if freely chosen by students adhering to 
nonsectarian school rules concerning respectful speech. If such were to oc-
cur, public schools would have the opportunity to teach the respect so nec-
essary for tolerance in a pluralistic society. 
The minimalist interpretation would also better enable government to 
promote the tolerance without which our pluralistic society cannot survive. 
Indeed, the neutrality principle between belief and unbelief has sidelined, to 
some degree, America's most influential teachers of tolerance, namely, the 
religions that believe in God. These religions are especially helpful in the 
promotion of tolerance for three reasons. First of all, it is the religious belief 
in God-considered as a proper name, or as a generic term for a supreme 
being, or as an impersonal cosmic enforcer of morality-that is responsible 
for motivating many, if not most, Americans to feel obligated to follow the 
Golden Rule and to treat others respectfully.77 Consider, for instance, Chris-
tianity: "You shall love your neighbor as thyself';78 Judaism: "Love your 
neighbor as yourself: I am the Lord"79 and, "The stranger who resides with 
you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself, 
for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I the lord am your God";80 
Islam: "The most righteous of men is the one who is glad that men should 
have what is pleasing to himself, and who dislikes for them what is . . . 
disagreeable";81 Hinduism: "One should never do that to another which one 
regards as injurious to one's own self';82 and, Buddhism: "Hurt not others 
in ways that you yourself would find hurtfuL"83 Although differences in the 
context and the formulations of the Golden Rule in these citations indicate 
that there are significant nuances present in these diverse religions, these 
differences do not vitiate two overwhelming similarities, namely, the obli-
gation to treat others respectfully and the identification of that obligation as 
religious. The import of this religious obligation is to strengthen the argu-
ment that just as others should neither demean nor interfere with one's own 
77. The personalist Golden Rule has an ancient heritage: It is found in the rule of universal 
brotherhood characteristic of Greco-Roman natural law. It is also found in the Enlightenment 
ethics of Kant that proscribes the inconsistency of treating persons purely as means to one's own 
end. See Immanuel Kant. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: On a Supposed Right to Lie 
Because of Philanthropic Concerns n. 429 (James W. Ellington trans., 3d ed .• Hackett Publg. Co. 
1993). Our founding fathers were especially influenced by the Greco-Roman natural law tradition. 
See e.g. Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (U. 
of Kan. 1985). 
78. Matthew 22:39 (New Am. Bible). 
79. Torah: The Five Books of Moses 217 (2d ed., Jewish Publication Socy. of Am. 1962) 
(quoting Leviticus 19:18). 
80. Id. at 218 (quoting Leviticus 19:33). 
81. Jeffrey Wattles, The Golden Rule 192 n. 2 (Oxford U. Press 1996) (quoting Sukhanan-i-
Muhammad no. 63). 
82. Id. at 191 n. I (quoting Mahabharata bk. 13, ch. 113). 
83. Id. at 192 n. 3 (quoting Udana-Varga 5.18). 
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religious exercises, one should neither demean nor interfere with the relig-
ious exercises of others. In this way, the religions of the Golden Rule pro-
vide incalculable support for the civic obligation to tolerate the religious 
practices of others. From this perspective, the evenhanded, noncoercive 
governmental support of religion would promote the respect so crucial for 
tolerance within pluralistic American society. 
Secondly, revolutionary advances in biotechnology promise to identify 
human beings-not as free agents worthy of respect-but as animals that 
can be controlled by psychogenic drugs and valued primarily as the source 
of the embryonic stem cells that can make the wealthy invulnerable to ill-
ness and the frailties of old age. Such a commodification of human beings 
would vitiate the importance of respecting human dignity and promulgate 
an instrumental view of persons that would then become the bastion of dis-
respectful intolerance. Defeating this instrumental view of persons cannot 
be achieved simply through America's traditions and the Constitution, but 
only through the conviction that every human being is worthy of respect 
regardless of size, origin, and genetic value. Developing this conviction of 
personalist anthropology and morality is going to require the assistance of 
America's religious institutions. 
Finally. the religious belief in God is the only belief that openly ac-
knowledges a realm of human action beyond the purview of human review 
and the parameters of political communities. Accordingly, any state that 
refuses to accommodate the free exercise of religion is a state that claims 
political allegiances are the greatest and that religious practices are to be 
subordinated to the state's interests. Such a state fails to tolerate the relig-
ious belief that one's obligations to God are unsurpassable. By so doing, 
such a state teaches its citizens to be intolerant of religious believers. On the 
other hand, if a state accommodates the religious practices of diverse be-
lievers in God. it teaches tolerance. 
CONCLUSION 
The state's compelling interest in promoting tolerance requires identi-
fying the proper ground of tolerance. This ground cannot be a lack of certi-
tude, the impotence of coercion, nor human dignity considered apart from 
the common good: for tolerance is not an intellectual virtue but a moral 
virtue necessitated by the common good. Furthermore, although the com-
mon good suffices to ground tolerance, it is not a ground persuasive to strict 
secularists and ideologues. For despite their differences, both oppose relig-
ious toleration and liberty as being dangerous to the body politic. Only the 
belief in God suffices to counter this ground for intolerance. Hence, without 
governmental support for the belief in God and governmental accommoda-
tion of diverse religious practices, religious intolerance cannot be ade-
quately countered. 
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Currently, government support for the belief in God is being hindered 
by the Supreme Court's maximist interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause (which mandates a hostile secularism), and by the adoption of 
Smith's principle of indifference towards unintentionally burdening relig-
ious practice. These interpretations of the First Amendment not only hinder 
the free exercise of religion, but they also are unnecessary since a minimal-
ist interpretation of the Establishment Clause and a more rigorous interpre-
tation of the Free Exercise Clause would harmonize with the bulk of the 
Court's precedents, while also permitting the evenhanded and non-coercive 
accommodation of religion. Moreover, if the Court does not alter her pre-
sent course, she will not only be unable to promote the tolerance so neces-
sary for a free and religiously diverse society, but she will find herself 
promoting intolerance and unraveling the tapestry so carefully and inge-
niously woven by America's founders. 
